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C.R.B. V. C.C. AND B.C.1:  PROTECTING CHILDREN’S NEED FOR STABILITY IN 
CUSTODY MODIFICATION DISPUTES BETWEEN BIOLOGICAL PARENTS AND THIRD 
PARTIES  
 
“Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts to predict the future 
rather than to understand the past.”2 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
More than one million American children are affected by their parents’ divorce each 
year,3 and custody decisions4 are “[a]mong the most difficult decisions judges must 
make today.”5  In particular, child custody disputes involving biological parents and 
third parties create extremely complex issues that challenge courts and legislators to 
determine the significance of biology.6  In C.R.B. v. C.C. and B.C.,7 a father and his 
                                                 
1  959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998). 
2  Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 
757, 762 (1985).  Litigation results often depend on the court’s determination of whether a 
prior event did or did not occur.  Id.   However, in custody litigation, courts frequently 
examine the parties’ personalities, priorities, financial status, and emotional stability to 
attempt to make the optimum judgment for the child’s future.  Id. 
3  BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES  106 (117th ed. 
1997).  During 1990, an estimated 1,075,000 children were involved in divorce.  Id.  During 
1980, an estimated 1,174,000 children were involved in divorce.  Id.  During 1970, an estimated 
870,000 children were involved in divorce.  Id.   
4  Cases and statutes rarely provide a definition of the term “custody.”  HOMER H. CLARK, 
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES  § 19.2 (2nd ed. 1988).  It has 
been labeled as a “slippery” word  because it “expresses a complex of both rights and 
obligations, the combination of which varies considerably from case to case.”  Id.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines ‘custody of children’ as “[t]he care, control and maintenance of a 
child which may be awarded by a court to one of the parents as in a divorce or separation 
proceedings.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1991).  Significantly, statutory or 
common law in every state allows the courts to modify custody orders.  Wexler, supra note 2, 
at 760; see discussion infra Part II.B.1.  In contrast, adoption is a legal process that actually 
terminates the legal rights and obligations that exist between the biological parents and the 
child.  See Homer, supra , at § 20.1. 
5  Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in Custody 
Disputes Be in Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539, 539 (1990/1991).  Salthe asserts, 
“In many circumstances both prospective custodians feel very strongly about the child, and 
in the most difficult cases both are perfectly able to take on the responsibility of custody.”  
Id. 
6  Carolyn Wilkes Kaas,  Breaking up a Family or Putting it Back Together Again:  
Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1996).  Third party involvement in custody cases forces both courts 
and legislators to evaluate the very meaning of the term “parent.”  Id.  In addition, some of 
these custody cases “highlight the often conflicting societal values of providing nurturing 
1
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children’s maternal grandparents8 were embroiled in a custody battle.9  The father 
attempted to modify a prior custody order that granted permanent custody of his 
children to the grandparents.10  Consequently, the Alaska Supreme Court was forced to 
weigh “two foundational policies in child custody law . . . the law’s preference for 
parental over nonparental custody, and the law’s desire to meet children’s needs for 
stability . . . .”11   
 
This Note examines the collision of the “foundational policies” recognized by the 
Alaska Supreme Court.  Part II provides an overview of the parental preference 
doctrine and custody modification standards.12  Part III presents the facts, procedural 
history, and the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in C.R.B.13  Finally,  Part IV analyzes 
the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision and its consequences.14  The Alaska Supreme 
Court properly rejected the use of a parental preference in custody modification 
disputes, and its holding produced a desirable outcome.15  However, this Note 
establishes why the court should adopt a more stringent modific ation standard to 
safeguard children’s need for stability in future custody modification cases.16 
 
 II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  The “Parental Preference” Doctrine 
                                                                                                                         
and safe homes for children and leaving parents free to raise their children in their own way, 
without intrusion.”  Id. at 1048-49.  In initial custody disputes between biological parents, 
courts award custody based on the best interests of the child.  Janet Leach Richards, The 
Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties:  Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 
NOVA L. REV. 733, 734 (1992).  Under this standard, the child’s needs and welfare are superior 
to either parent’s interest.  Id. 
7  C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998). 
8  The nuclear family structure began to erode in the mid-1960's, and as a result, 
grandparents have been assuming active parental roles at an increasing rate.   Robert C. 
Paden, Jr., Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Parents v. Grandparents, 52 J. MO. B. 156, 
156 (1996).  The number of children living in households headed by grandparents has 
increased by over fifty percent since 1970, and both parents are absent in approximately one-
third of these households.  Mary C. Rudasill, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: 
Problems and Policy from an Illinois Perspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215, 216 (1995).  This growth 
in households headed by grandparents has promp ted national attention, legislation, and state 
policy revisions.  Id. at 216. 
9  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 376.  
10  Id. at 377. 
11  Id. at 379. 
12  See infra notes 17-51 and accompanying text. 
13  See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text. 
14  See infra notes 73-124 and accompanying text. 
15  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.   
16  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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1.  Description, Development of the Law, and Current Trends 
 
Custody standards that give preference to biological parents reflect the historical 
view of the relationship between parents and their children.17  Although society no 
longer regards children as the property of their parents, the view that biological parents 
have a natural right to the custody of their children has endured.18  The United States 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether courts should apply a parental 
preference in custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party.19  
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.20 eliminates the 
                                                 
17  Melanie B. Lewis, Note, Inappropriate Application of the Best Interests of the Child 
Standard Leads to Worst Case Scenario: In re C.C.R.S., 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 262 (1997).  
Until the nineteenth century, the state refused to intrude on the parent-child relationship and 
gave parents total command over their children.  Id.  By the twentieth century, society 
recognized that children are individuals, and that they also require protection.  Id.  However, 
the state continued to refuse to intervene unless the parental care endangered the child.  Id. 
18  Id.; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 879 (1984) [hereinafter Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood].  Bartlett discusses the role of 
natural law in the concept of parenthood as an exclusive status.  Id. at 886.  Natural law 
dictates that parental rights “arise from a relationship that is entirely apart from the power of 
the State.”  Id.  These rights exist regardless of whether a parent acts in the child’s best 
interest.  Id. at 889.  Also, natural law presumes that because the basic building block of 
society is the family, the entire fabric of society will disintegrate if parents are unable to raise 
their children without intervention.  Id. at 888.  Therefore, the law often dictates that 
relationships based on psychological bonds must be sacrificed for those based on biology.  
Id. at 882.  However, the rigid nature of the natural law framework works to the detriment of 
children who form meaningful bonds outside of the nuclear family unit.  Id. at 890.  As stated 
by Bartlett, “[T]hese children are powerless to change the social patterns of which they are a 
part, and they cannot respond meaningfully to legal or social sanctions intended to promote 
the nuclear family.”  Id. 
19  Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child 
Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705, 728-29 (1986).  
20  491 U.S. 110 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. Trojak, 586 A.2d 397 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  While Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and cohabitating, Carole 
gave birth to Victoria.  Id. at 113.  Michael H. filed an action in the California Superior Court to 
prove he was Victoria’s biological father and obtain visitation rights.  Id. at 114.  Blood tests 
showed a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria’s biological father.  Id.  However, 
pursuant to a state statute, the court refused to admit the blood tests into evidence, granted 
Gerald motion for summary judgment, and denied Michael any visitation.  See id. at 115.  
Michael argued that the United States Supreme Court had previously recognized a parent’s 
fundamental constitutional right to visitation or custody of their biological children.  Id. at 
123.  However, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the fundamental right referred to 
in previous decisions was the right to a “protected family unit” rather than a biological 
parent’s right to custody.  See id. at 124.   
3
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contention that courts are required to utilize a parental preference.21  In addition, several 
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that parental rights are derived from the 
biological parent’s relationship with their child rather than the biological connection.22 
 
In initial custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party, a majority of 
states apply a parental preference standard.23  First, several states24 have adopted a 
parental rights standard, which precludes a court from considering a third party as a 
custodian without a threshold showing of extraordinary circumstances.25  Second, 
most states apply a rebuttable presumption26 that favors the biological parent.27  Many 
                                                 
21  See Salthe, supra  note 5, at 547.  Salthe states that the essence of the Supreme Court’s 
decision was to “shift the fundamental right at issue to one that protects the interpersonal 
relationships that develop within the unitary family, rather than one that singularly protects 
the biological relationships.”  Id. at 548.  As a result, courts are free to make decisions based 
on public policy when deciding whether to favor biological parents in custody battles.  Id. at 
548.   
22  Haynie, supra  note 19 at 729; see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (concluding that the Constitution protects a family unit, even if the family members are 
not the child’s biological parents, if it is providing for the child’s needs); Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (emphasizing that 
“the importance of the family relationship . . . stems from the emotional attachments that 
derive from the intimacy of daily association . . .”).  Haynie argues that any standard used in 
custody disputes that provides a preference to a biological parent is unconstitutional.  
Haynie, supra note 19, at 706. 
23  See Haynie, supra note 19, at 711.  States that do not apply a parental preference 
standard include Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.  Id. at 721 & n.58.  Instead, these states 
apply a best interests standard, which focuses solely on the needs and welfare of the child.  
Id. at 721.  The best interests standard emerged in the mid-1960’s in response to the erosion 
of the nuclear family.  Paden, supra  note 8, at 156.   In states that apply the best interests 
standard, nonparents have a greater chance of obtaining custody since the court may find 
that nonparental custody is in the child’s best interests.  Id.  This standard “has been 
criticized as resulting in an indeterminacy perhaps unparalleled in any other area of the law.”  
Wexler, supra  note 2, at 779-80; see discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
24  Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia clearly utilize a 
parental rights standard.  Haynie, supra  note 19, at 708 & n.12.  Mississippi uses the language 
of the parental rights standard but seems to be willing to consider additional evidence.  Id. 
25  Kaas, supra  note 6, at 1065 (providing a “blueprint” for deciding third party initial 
custody disputes and distinguishing between appropriate standards for “removal” and 
“reunification”).  Some jurisdictions consider this standard to be required by the United 
States Constitution, while other jurisdictions have adopted it as a matter of policy.  Id.  In 
New York, extraordinary circumstances include abuse, abandonment, neglect, or parental 
unfitness.   See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E. 2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976).   
26  A ‘presumption’ is “an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another 
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. . . .  A presumption is 
either conclusive or rebuttable.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (6th ed. 1991).  A ‘conclusive 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss2/6
1999] C.R.B. V. C.C. 
courts adopted this presumption based on the assumption that granting custody to a 
biological parent promotes the child’s best interests.28  Courts applying a parental 
preference will award custody to a “fit” parent29 even if a child has been residing with a 
third party for an extended period of time.30 
 
2.  Alaska:  Development of the Law 
 
Alaska courts apply a parental preference in initial custody disputes between 
biological parents and third parties.31  In Turner v. Pannick,32 the Alaska Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
presumption’ is “created when a jury is charged that it must infer the presumed fact if certain 
predicate facts are established.”  Id.  In contrast, a ‘rebuttable presumption’ “can be 
overturned upon the showing of sufficient proof.”  Id. 
27  See, e.g., Haynie, supra  note 19, at 711.  Haynie categorizes three types of 
presumptions.  First, the fitness presumption standard presumes that the biological parent will 
be the best parent unless the third party proves that extraordinary circumstances make the 
third party more fit than the parent.  Id. at 712.   The third party’s burden remains “almost 
unsurmountable.” Id.  Second, in the convincing presumption standard the biological parent 
has a prima facie right to custody unless the third party shows by clear and convincing 
evidence that they should have custody based on the best interests of the child.  Id. at 715.  
Third, under the disappearing presumption standard, the courts consider factors regarding 
the best interests of the child, and the presumption gives custody to the biological parent 
only if all other factors are equal.  Id. at 720. 
28  See Richards, supra  note 6, at 736.  (“This rule is based logically upon the experience of 
mankind that blood is thicker than water and that a natural parent will normally expend greater 
effort and sacrifice on behalf of a child than will a stranger or a third party . . .”)  (quoting In re 
Custody of Hampton, 5 Adams Co. L.J. 84, 91 (Pa. C.P. 1963)); see also Michael B. Thompson, 
Child-Custody Disputes Between Parents and Non-parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the 
Parental-right Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 S.D.  L.  REV. 534, 534 (1989) (stating that a 
parental preference “focuses . . . on parental fitness, presuming that parents are best able to 
nurture their children”). 
29  Factors indicating that a parent is not fit include “misconduct, neglect, immorality, 
abandonment and/or general dereliction of custodial duties.”  Salthe, supra  note 5, at 541.  
30  Sandra R. Blair, Jurisdiction, Standing, and Decisional Standards in Parent-
Nonparent Custody Disputes--In Re Marriage of Allen, WASH. L. REV. 111, 116 (1982) 
(asserting that the best interests of the child standard should be utilized since parental rights 
are a factor in the balancing process, and therefore, are protected, and stating that the 
parental preference doctrine is premised on an “almost mystical belief in the superiority of the 
biological parents”). 
31  See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975); see also  Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 
1195 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308 (Alaska 1977).  In contrast, in initial custody 
disputes between biological parents, the Alaska courts award custody based on the best 
interests of the child.  See ALASKA STAT . § 25.24.150 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998).  ALASKA 
STAT . § 25.24.150 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998) reads as follows: 
(a) In an action for divorce or for legal separation or for placement of a child when 
one or both parents have died, the court may, if it has jurisdiction under AS 
5
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Court held that in an initial custody determination, the court must award custody to a 
biological parent unless the third party shows33 that “the parent is unfit,34 has 
                                                                                                                         
25.30.300--25.30.320, and is an appropriate forum under AS 25.30.350 and 25.30.360, 
during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or at any time thereafter 
during the minority of a child of the marriage, make, modify, or vacate an order for 
the custody of or visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper, 
including an order that provides for visitation by a grandparent or other person if 
that is in the best interests of the child. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem for a child is appointed, the appointment shall be made 
under the terms of AS 25.24.310(c). 
(c)The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the 
child under AS 25.20.060 --  25.20.130. In determining the best interests of the child 
the court shall consider 
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child; 
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs; 
(3) the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a 
preference; 
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each parent; 
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and 
the desirability of maintaining continuity; 
(6) the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent 
relationship between the child and the other parent; 
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the 
proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the parents; 
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other members of the 
household directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child; 
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent. 
(d) In awarding custody the court may consider only those facts that directly affect 
the well-being of the child. 
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of (d) of this section, in awarding custody the 
court shall comply with the provisions of  25 U.S.C. 1901 -- 1963 (P.L. 95-608, the 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978). 
(f) If the issue of child custody is before the court at the time it issues a judgment 
under AS 25.24.160, the court shall concurrently issue a judgment for custody under 
this section unless, subject to AS 25.24.155, the court delays the custody decision 
for a later time. 
Id. 
32  540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975). 
33  Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197 (indicating that the burden of proof is on the third party); Britt, 
567 P.2d at 310 (stating that the nonparent must overcome the parental preference by a 
preponderance of the evidence). 
34  In Britt, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court’s finding that the mother 
was unfit was clearly erroneous.  Britt, 567 P.2d at 310.  The Alaska Supreme Court stated that 
evidence of the mother’s youth, pregnancy, remarriage, and relocations fell “far short of the 
showing which must be made.”  Id. at 311.  “Where custody is being contested between a 
6
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abandoned the child,35 or that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive 
custody.”36   The “welfare of the child” requirement is satisfied by evidence that 
parental custody would be clearly detrimental to the child.37 
 
B.  Modification of Custody:  “Substantial Change in Circumstances” Standard 
 
1.  Description, Development of the Law, and Current Trends 
 
Although it appears that there are a greater number of hearings and trials regarding 
modification of custody rather than initial custody, literature has paid little attention to 
custody modifications.38  Regardless of whether the initial custody decree results from 
litigation or is consensual, it is universally recognized that the court possesses judicial 
power to modify the decree.39   
                                                                                                                         
parent and a non-parent, it is not enough that this evidence may support the conclusion that 
the non-parent would provide a better environment for the child.”  Id. 
35  The Alaska Supreme Court previously specified “what constitutes sufficient 
abandonment to deprive a mother of custody of her child.”  Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055 & n.4   
“[A]bandonment consists of conduct on the part of the parent which implies a conscious 
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the 
parent-child relationship.”  Id. (quoting D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973)).  
36  Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055.  In Turner, the child’s mother filed a petition against the 
child’s aunt to obtain custody of her child.  Id. at 1052.  The Alaska Supreme Court noted that 
prior Alaska law was ambiguous in regards to the test applicable in custody disputes between 
a biological parent and a third party.  Id. at 1053.  The Alaska Supreme Court held that the 
mother was entitled to custody because the aunt did not show that the mother was unfit or 
had abandoned the child, or that the child’s welfare required the court to award custody to 
the aunt.  Id. at 1055.  The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that it is dangerous to give courts 
the power to use the best interests test as its sole criterion to award custody to third parties.  
Id. at 1054.  The Alaska Supreme Court was concerned that if a judge personally opposes the 
biological parents’ limited means, the parents may lose custody of their children.  Id.   
37  Turner, 540 P.2d at 1054; see also  Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 989 (Alaska 1989).  In 
Buness, a third party was the child’s primary care-giver for ten years.  Id. at 989.  The Alaska 
Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the 
child’s welfare dictated that the third party receive custody.  Id.  The Alaska Supreme Court 
reasoned that the child and the third party had a “strong emotional bond.”  Id.  A school 
psychologist’s report noted the child’s “highly emotional response” upon learning that he 
had to leave the third party’s home.  Id.  
38  Wexler, supra  note 2, at 757.   
39  Id. at 760.  A court has the power to modify a custody order either by its “express 
statutory authority or by its common law equity powers over the welfare of children.”  Id.  
Also, jurisdiction is always available, even if the court that issued the initial order did not 
reserve jurisdiction.  Id.  In contrast, an order terminating parental rights is final, and once it is 
entered, the parent loses any possibility of obtaining custody.  See, e.g., Thompson, supra 
note 28, at 559. 
7
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The trend in the law indicates that moving parties are obtaining custody 
modifications with greater ease.40  There are three standards used by state courts to 
modify custody orders.41  First, the traditional custody modification standard permits 
modification if the moving party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances 
that warrants a modification to further the child’s best interests.42  Second, several 
states have relaxed these requirements and apply a best interests test without requiring a 
threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances since the initial custody 
decree.43  Finally, the standard under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
(hereinafter the “UMDA”)44 requires either consent or a showing of serious harm to the 
                                                 
40  Wexler, supra  note 2, at 760.  
41  Id. 
42  Id.  The traditional standard has been the controlling law in a majority of jurisdictions 
for many years.  Id. at 761.  In most states adopting this standard, the standard is derived from 
judge-made law that adds gloss to general statutes stating that modification may be granted 
according to the child’s best interests.   Id.  Judges applying this standard possess a 
tremendous amount of discretion.  Id. at 762.  Wexler writes, “Not surprisingly, decisions 
made in this framework are less a product of reasoned application of precedent than of the 
personality, temperament, background, interests, and biases of the trial judge or of the 
community that elected him.”  Id.  The moving party must show that the change occurred 
subsequent to the initial custody order, or that a fact was not within the court’s knowledge.  
Id. at 765.  In states adopting this traditional standard, re-litigation, rather than finality, is 
encouraged.  Id. at 763.   
43  Id. at 760-61.   
44  UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 101-506 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1998).  
The modification standard provides: 
[T]he Court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis 
of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at 
the time of the entry of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the 
circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that the modification is necessary 
to serve the best interest of the child.  In applying theses standards the court shall 
retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior decree unless: 
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification; 
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent of the 
custodian; or  
(3) the child’s present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral, 
or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment 
endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health, and the harm 
likely to be caused by a change in environment is outweighed by its advantages to 
him. 
Id. § 409(b).  In addition, during the first two years after the initial custody order, a court 
cannot review a modification application unless the movant can establish by affidavit “that 
there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may endanger seriously his 
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.”  Id. § 409(a).   
8
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child prior to modification.45 
 
2.  Alaska:  Development of the Law 
 
In Alaska, a motion to modify custody must allege facts that, if proved, would 
establish a substantial change in circumstances.46  Prior to C.R.B., Alaska courts 
applied this standard in modification disputes between biological parents but had not 
determined which standard applies in disputes between biological parents and third 
parties.47  The party moving for custody modification must show changes that affect 
the child’s welfare.48  In addition, these changes must reflect more than the passage of 
                                                 
45  Wexler, supra  note 2, at 773.  Only two states have statutes which fully adopt the 
UMDA provisions.  Id. at 776 (citing COLO. REV. STAT . § 14-10-131 (Supp. 1983); KY. REV. 
STAT . § 403.340 (1984)).  Several other states, including Arizona, Illinois, and Washington, 
have adopted portions of the UMDA provisions.  Id. 
46  ALASKA STAT . § 25.20.110 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998) states: 
(a) An award of custody of a child or visitation with the child may be modified if the 
court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the 
award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.  If a parent opposes 
the modification of the award of custody or visitation with the child and the 
modification is granted, the court shall enter on the record its reason for the 
modification. 
(b) When making a determination relating to child custody under (a) of this section, 
the court shall consider the past history of the parents with respect to their 
compliance with the child support payment provisions of temporary or permanent 
support orders or agreements relating to the child or to other children.  Under this 
subsection, the court may consider a parent’s failure to pay child support only if the 
parent had actual knowledge of the amount of the child support obligation and had 
funds available for payment of support or could have obtained those funds through 
reasonable efforts, as determined by the court. 
(c ) In a proceeding involving the modification of an award for custody of a child or 
visitation with a child, a finding that a crime involving domestic violence has 
occurred since the last custody or visitation determination is a finding of a change 
of circumstances under (a) of this section. 
Id.  Before and after codification of its rule in 1982, the Alaska Supreme Court required that 
the change in circumstances be “substantial.”  See, e.g., Deivert v. Oseira, 628 P.2d 575, 578 
(Alaska 1981) (“The concept of ‘substantial change’ of circumstances . . . may be considered 
simply a rule of judicial economy designed to discourage discontented parents from 
continually renewing custody proceedings.”); Garding v. Garding, 767 P.2d 183,  (Alaska 
1989) (stating that the party moving for custody modification had the burden of proving a 
substantial change in circumstances). 
47  See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375 & n.3 (Alaska 1998).   
48  S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985).  In S.N.E., the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that the superior court improperly relied on a “real or imagined social stigma attaching to 
Mother’s status as a lesbian.”  Id. at 879.  “Consideration of a parent’s conduct is appropriate 
only when the evidence supports a finding that a parent’s conduct has or reasonably will 
9
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time.49  A party may show substantial change by demonstrating unilateral improvement 
in his or her own circumstances.50  Significantly, Alaska courts have consistently 
recognized the importance of stability in children’s lives by asserting that the changes 
must overcome our deep reluctance to shuttle children back and forth.51   
 
 III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Facts  
 
During 1988, Catherine and Roberto52 got married.53  Catherine had developed a 
cocaine addiction prior to the marriage.54  Catherine and Roberto had two children, 
Peter, who was born in 1989, and Brian, who was born in 1991.55  In 1992, Catherine 
and Roberto were divorced by decree of dissolution in the Superior Court at Anchorage, 
and Roberto gave sole custody of Peter and Brian to Catherine.56 
                                                                                                                         
have an adverse impact on the child and his best interests.”  Id.  The Alaska Supreme Court 
reasoned that the record indicated that parental neglect was absent, the child’s development 
was superb, and there was no increased probability that the child would become homosexual. 
 Id.; see also  Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1982) (stating that a parent’s 
instability in relationships will not justify modification of custody if the behavior does not 
affect the child). 
49  Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d 732, 734 & n.3 (Alaska 1973) (holding that the evidence was 
insufficient to show a change in circumstances).  
50  See Nichols v. Mandelin, 790 P.2d 1367, 1372 & n.15 (Alaska 1990) (holding that 
evidence of the mother’s “overall maturation,” her control of a former alcohol problem, and 
changes in her employment and marital status constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances that warranted a modification of custody).  The Alaska Supreme Court 
previously held that a change in custody cannot be justified by mere improvement in the 
circumstances of one of the parties.  See, e.g., Garding, 767 P.2d at 186; Gratrix v. Gratrix, 
652 P.2d at 76, 82 (Alaska 1982).  However, Nichols v. Mandelin distinguished Garding and 
Gratrix “on the basis that these decisions were not intended to preclude a trial court from 
finding that significant long term changes in a party’s lifestyle could constitute a substantial 
change in circumstances . . . .”  Nichols v. Mandelin, 790 P.2d at n.15. 
51  Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d at 735 (“Children should not be shuttled back and forth 
between divorced parents unless there are important circumstances justifying such change . . 
. .”); see also Gratrix, 652 P.2d at 82-83 (Alaska 1982) (stating that “finality and certainty in 
custody matters are critical to the child’s emotional welfare); Morel v. Morel, 647 P.2d 605, 608 
(Alaska 1982) (asserting that the Alaska Supreme Court has “continually stressed the 
desirability of maintaining continuity of care”). 
52  The Alaska Supreme Court used pseudonyms throughout its opinion.  C.R.B., 959 P.2d 
at 376. 
53  Id. at 377. 
54  Id.  
55  Id. 
56  Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104) 
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B.  Procedural History 
 
A “drug-induced crisis” during 1993 motivated Carl and Betty Clark, the children’s 
maternal grandparents, to obtain interim custody and move for permanent custody in 
the Superior Court at Palmer.57  Roberto subsequently filed a motion to modify the 
divorce decree to give him custody of Peter and Brian.58  However, he withdrew his 
motion in 1994.59   In January, 1995, the superior court granted the Clarks sole legal 
and physical custody of the children.60  In September, 1996, Roberto moved to modify 
the custody order, arguing that changes in his circumstances warranted modification.61 
 The superior court dismissed Roberto’s motion during February, 1997.62  The superior 
court held that Roberto’s factual assertions, even if true, do not show a substantial 
change of circumstances to warrant modification.63  Roberto appealed the denial of his 
                                                                                                                         
(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief). 
57  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377.  The Clarks claimed not to know of Roberto’s whereabouts, but 
Roberto disputed this.  Id.  Roberto learned of the custody proceedings during 1993.  Id. 
58  Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104) 
(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief).  
“Contrary to [Roberto’s] assertion in his Appellant Brief . . . his motion to change custody 
was never opposed.”  Id.  In addition, Roberto filed “lengthy” affidavits from himself and his 
new wife claiming that they were “ready, willing and very anxious” to obtain custody.  Id. 
59  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377.  During September, 1996,  Roberto stated that he withdrew from 
the 1993-94 custody proceeding because the Clarks told him they only wanted temporary 
custody.  Id.  He stated that he did not realize his custody rights were at risk and did not keep 
in touch with his attorney because of his financial situation.  Id.  Roberto filed a letter that he 
wrote to the superior court after he withdrew his custody motion and prior to trial.  “I still 
wish to gain custody and my visiting [privileges],” he stated in the letter, but “I have not filed 
for custody again as my budget cannot endure any more lawyer and court fees . . . .  I am not 
an absent[ee] parent . . . .”  Id. 
60  Id.  Roberto did not appear at the trial in the superior court on the Clarks’ motion for 
permanent custody.  Id.  In addition, Roberto did not visit his children from July, 1993 until 
March, 1996.  Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104) 
(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief). 
61  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377.  Roberto argued that the following changes in circumstances 
were substantial and that they warranted a modification of the custody order:  Roberto 
obtained his American citizenship; Roberto’s marriage and business had grown stable and 
successful; Roberto and his new wife purchased a home in a suburb that was well-suited for 
the children; Roberto was rebuilding relationships with his sons after three years without 
communication; the Clarks had developed health problems; the Clarks were interfering with 
Roberto’s relations with his sons; and Roberto discovered that Betty Clark was the subject of 
a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) investigation in 1980.  Id. 
62  Id. at 378.  The superior court dismissed the motion without a hearing.  Id. 
63  Id. at 384.  
11
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motion for modification of custody.64 
 
C.  Alaska Supreme Court Decision 
 
The Alaska Supreme Court analyzed whether a biological parent moving to modify a 
court order awarding permanent legal custody to a third party must make the same 
threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances as in a dispute between 
biological parents.65  The court held that a biological parent must “show no less 
substantial a change in circumstances” as in dispute between biological parents.66  
                                                 
64  Id. at 378.  
65  Id. at 377.  Roberto argued that the policies underlying the parental preference doctrine 
dictate that a parental preference should apply when a biological parent moves to modify 
nonparental custody.  Id. at 379.  Therefore, Roberto insisted, a parent attempting to modify 
nonparental custody does not need to show as substantial a change in circumstances as a 
parent modifying another parent’s custody.  Id.  In addition, Roberto argued that a parent can 
show a less substantial change to modify visitation.  Id.; e.g., Hermosillo v. Hermosillo, 797 
P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1990).  However, the Alaska Supreme Court asserted that a change in 
visitation is less significant to a child than a change in custody, and Roberto did not provide 
any reason to view a change in permanent custody like a change in visitation.  C.R.B., 959 
P.2d at 379. 
66  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 381.  According to the Alaska Supreme Court, research suggests that 
its holding is a majority rule.  Id. at 380-81.  The court cited the following cases and 
annotation:  Ex Parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863, 865-66 (Ala. 1984) (limited by Reuter v. 
Neese, 586 So.2d 232 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)) (ruling that a mother showing improved 
circumstances and that she could provide for her child in the same manner in which the 
custodial grandparents had been providing for the child failed to show that a custody 
modification would materially promote the child’s welfare and best interest);  Jones v. 
Strauser, 585 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ark. 1979) (holding that a father attempting to modify an order 
awarding custody of his child to the maternal grandparents failed to show that the 
grandfather’s death was a change in circumstances justifying a modification when considered 
from the standpoint of the child’s welfare); Bivens v. Cottle, 462 S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that a mother attempting to modify a order awarding custody of her 
children to their grandparents was not entitled to a parental preference and was required to 
show a change in circumstances); In re Whiting, 590 N.E.2d 859, 861-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(ruling that a mother entering into a judicially approved contractual agreement giving custody 
of her son to her sister and brother-law surrendered her right to a parental preference, and the 
mother was not entitled to a modification of custody because she alleged a change in her 
circumstances rather than in the circumstances of the custodian or the child); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 681 P.2d 78, 80-81 (Okla. 1984) (holding that although a mother demonstrated that 
her fitness to be a custodial parent had changed, she was not entitled to a modification of an 
order awarding custody of her children to the paternal grandparents because she did not 
show that this change directly affected the best interests of her children); Lear v. Lear, 863 
P.2d 482, 484 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a mother of a child in permanent custody of 
paternal grandparents did not show a substantial change in her parenting abilities to warrant 
relitigation of custody, and stating that evidence that the child is well adjusted in her home is 
12
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Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision.67 
                                                                                                                         
a relevant factor); Taylor v. Meek, 276 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1955) (reaffirmed after 
amendment of custody statute in In re Ferguson, 927 S.W.2d 766, 768-69 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996)) 
(holding that when a third party has custody of a child, a custody modification should be 
ordered only when the biological parent shows a change that is positive for the child, and 
reasoning that “a change of custody disrupts the child’s living arrangements and the 
channels of a child’s affection”); Dyer v. Howell, 184 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1971) (denying a father’s 
petition for modification of custody from the child’s aunt and uncle to himself, and holding 
that the father, who was declared not guilty of killing the child’s mother by reason of insanity 
and was later determined to be mentally competent, did not show a substantial change of 
circumstances);  Carol Crocca, Annotation, Continuity of Residence as Factor in Contest 
Between Parent and Nonparent for Custody of Child Who Has Been Residing with 
Nonparent--Modern Status, 15 A.L.R. 5th 692, 807-14 (1993) (collecting cases in which 
biological parents were required to prove a change in circumstances).  Id at 381 n.10. 
  In addition, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a court may deny a motion for modification 
of  child custody, without a hearing, based solely on the pleadings or material beyond the 
pleadings, such as affidavits.  Id. at 378.  The court must treat the facts alleged as 
“established.”  Id. (citing Christiansen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d 345, 346 n.2 (Alaska 1993)).  
Roberto argued that a parent moving for modification of custody deserves the same right to a 
hearing as a parent who has lost custody in a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) case but claims 
to be rehabilitated.  Id. at 379; see, e.g., Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Alaska 1981).  
However, the Clarks asserted that the CINA statute stresses family preservation, and Title 25 
focuses on permanently placing children in stable homes.  C.R..B., 959 P.2d at 379.  The 
Alaska Supreme Court held that the Clarks’ arguments were more persuasive than Roberto’s.  
Id.  Significantly, pursuant to Rita T., once a child moves to a permanent adoptive placement, 
a parent’s right to a rehabilitation hearing ends.  Rita T., 623 P.2d at 346. 
  Prior to its decision in C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court had not established which standard 
of review applies when there is no hearing on a motion to modify custody.  Id.  When there is 
a hearing, the Alaska Supreme Court will overturn a custody order only if the superior court 
abused its broad discretion  or its factual findings were clearly erroneous.  Id. (citing Hayes v. 
Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 898, n. 3. (Alaska 1996)).  The Alaska Supreme Court established that 
when there is no hearing, the standard of review of a denial of a motion to modify custody is 
de novo.  Id.  The Alaska Supreme Court will affirm the decision if “the facts alleged, even if 
proved, cannot warrant modification, or if the allegations are so general or conclusory, and so 
convincingly refuted by competent evidence, as to create no genuine issue of material fact 
requiring a hearing.”  Id.   
67  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 385.  The Alaska Supreme Court held that Roberto’s citizenship was 
“irrelevant, as it does not affect the children.”  Id. at 382.  The success of Roberto’s marriage 
and business were “relevant, but not controlling” because the superior court did not base its 
initial custody decision on concerns relating to instability.  Id. at 383.  In addition, Roberto 
and Penny’s purchase of a home and Roberto’s contact with his sons were “good steps 
towards readiness for custody but not sufficient to warrant a change.”  Id.  The Alaska 
Supreme Court stated that the Clarks’ health problems were illusory.  Id. at 382.  The Clarks’ 
interference with Roberto’s visitation would be a factor in a best interests inquiry but cannot 
constitute a substantial change of circumstances.  Id.  But see Siekawitch v. Siekawitch, 956 
13
Taylor: C.R.B. v. C.C.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
 
The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that “we should not . . . sacrifice the child’s 
need for stability in its care and living arrangements . . . .”68  The court asserted that 
application of a parental preference in the initial custody proceeding may create an 
“inevitable sacrifice.”69  This sacrifice occurs when the children’s interests indicate that 
a court should award custody to the third party, but the third party cannot rebut the 
parental preference.70   Therefore, in an initial custody proceeding, a biological parent’s 
rights are protected, despite the risk of this sacrifice.71  The court concluded that 
children’s need for stability should not be sacrificed by allowing a parental preference to 
weaken the requirements for modification of custody.72  
 
 IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
In C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court wisely refused to apply a parental preference 
in custody modification disputes between biological parents and third parties, and the 
court’s decision adequately protected Peter and Brian’s need for stability.73  However, 
for the reasons analyzed below, if the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply the 
substantial change in circumstances modification standard, it may not adequately 
safeguard children’s need for stability in future cases.74 
 
                                                                                                                         
P.2d 447, 451 (Alaska 1998) (holding that an inability to agree on a visitation schedule 
represented a change in circumstances that warranted a re-examination of the original custody 
decision).  The Alaska Supreme Court stated that Roberto’s allegation that Betty Clark was 
the subject of a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) investigation in 1980 were speculative.  C.R.B., 
959 P.2d at 383-84.   
68  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.   
69  Id. 
70  Id.; see supra  notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
71  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.  The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledges that the “parental 
preference is a vital safeguard against enabling nonparents to convince courts to remove 
children improperly from their parents.”  Id.  In addition, the court did not want to take “a step 
toward a totalitarian government.”  Id. (quoting Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska 
1975) (Dimond, J., concurring)).  In Turner, the Alaska Supreme Court expounded on the 
dangerous effects of a refusal to adopt a parental preference in an initial custody proceeding. 
 Turner, 540 P.2d at 1054. 
[W]e would be taking a step toward a totalitarian government.  Children could be 
removed from their parents’ custody at the will of the state, depending upon what 
some governmental petty tyrant decides is meant by the term . . . ‘best interests’ of 
the children.  Such a state of affairs would be entirely contrary to the form of 
government envisioned by the founding fathers of our nation. 
Id. at 1056 (Dimond, J., concurring).   
72  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380. 
73  See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2. 
74  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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A.  Collision of Foundational Policies 
 
1.  Law’s Preference for Parental Over Third Party Custody 
 
The law prefers parental custody over third party custody in initial custody 
disputes.75  In C.R.B., the children’s biological father argued that policy reasons dictate 
that a parental preference should be applied to weaken the requirements for custody 
modification.76  Advocates of the parental preference assert that it is necessary to 
protect the sanctity of the relationship that exists between a parent and a child.77  
Application of a parental preference creates predictability and judicial economy,78 and 
acts as a crucial safeguard that prevents a judge from utilizing extremely broad judicial 
discretion to make decisions based on personal biases.79  In particular, utilization of a 
                                                 
75  See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
76  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 379; see supra  note 65 and accompanying text. 
77  See Richards, supra  note 6, at 734 (asserting that in some circumstances, parents’ rights 
are not adequately protected when the courts award custody based solely on the child’s best 
interests);  supra  notes 17-18 and accompanying text.  The nuclear family, which is comprised 
of a married couple and their children, is the preferred social unit in America.  See Bartlett, 
Rethinking Parenthood, supra  note 18, at 879.  Parental autonomy provides incentives for 
parents to raise their children to the best of their abilities by creating security that neither the 
state nor third parties will interfere.  Id.  In addition, experts have determined that the loss 
experienced by children who have been adopted and separated from their biological families is 
more profound than loss caused by divorce or even death.   See Bernadette Weaver-Catalana, 
The Battle for Baby Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BUFF. L. REV 583, 600 (1995).  This 
sense of loss stems from an adoptee’s search for self, which is one of the fundamental 
dimensions of psychological development.  Id.  The adoptee’s search for self is affected by 
the adoptee’s attempts to deal with perceived rejection.  Id. at 601.   But see Katherine Bartlett, 
Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 [hereinafter Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood] 
(proposing that child custody should adopt a view of parenthood based on attachment and 
responsibility rather than possessiveness and rights); Thompson, supra  note 28, at 572 
(asserting that when courts utilize a parental preference standard, they are disregarding 
contemporary psychological studies indicating that psychological ties, rather than biology, 
bind a child to an adult); Salthe, supra  note 5, at 545 (arguing that although a parental 
preference should be applied in initial custody disputes, the definition of “parent” should be 
expanded to include “psychological parents” as well as a biological parents). 
78  See Kaas, supra  note 6, at 1090.  Kaas states, “Predictability has the benefit of 
discouraging the filing of groundless cases and encouraging the settlement of pending 
cases.”  Id.   
79  Id. at 1090.  Without the parental preference, the best interest of the child standard will 
be used.  See supra  note 23.  According to Katherine Bartlett: 
[T]he best interests of the child is a highly contingent social construction.  
Although we often pretend otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments about what 
is best for our children are as much the result of political and social judgments about 
what kind of society we prefer as they are conclusions based upon neutral or 
15
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parental preference mitigates the risk that a judge’s class biases80 and lifestyle biases81 
will determine the outcome of a custody dispute.82   
 
Painter v. Bannister 83 is frequently cited as a vivid example of the potential social 
engineering that may occur when a court applies its own value judgments rather than a 
parental preference.84  In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court awarded permanent 
custody of a young boy to his grandparents,85 even though there was no suggestion in 
the record that his biological father was an unfit parent.86  The court based its decision 
on a comparison of the father’s “Bohemian” lifestyle with the grandparents’ 
“conventional” way of life.87  
                                                                                                                         
scientific data about what is “best” for children.  The resolution of conflicts over 
children ultimately is less a matter of objective fact-finding than it is a matter of 
deciding what kind of children and families--what kind of relationships--we want to 
have. 
Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, supra  note 77, at 303.  But see Thompson, supra note 28, 
at 534.   Thompson argues that the parental preference should be abolished.  Id. at 572.  He 
asserts that courts have a duty to protect children under the parens patriae doctrine.  Id.  This 
doctrine evolved as a result of England’s feudal system, and was adopted by courts of equity 
in America.  Id. at 551.  The parens patriae doctrine dictates that courts have an obligation to 
protect individuals who cannot protect themselves, including children, the elderly, and the 
insane.  Id.  Thompson reasons that when a nonparent is a party in a custody dispute, the 
court’s focus shifts from the child to the parent.  Id. at 534.  Consequently, the court 
abandons the child’s best interests, and also abandons its duty to protect the child under the 
parens patriae doctrine.  Id. at 561. 
80  Custody disputes are often decided based on economic factors.  See Weaver-Catalana, 
supra  note 77, at 605.   In addition, the third party’s strategy may include an attempt to 
deplete the parent’s financial resources through legal fees.  Id. at 606.  Weaver-Catalana 
writes, “[W]e are heading down a slippery slope at the bottom of which lurks an issue we 
Americans are reluctant to face: the awful realities and inequalities of wealth and class.”  Id. 
(quoting Richard Cohen, Class Action, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 12, 1993, at W9). 
81  “The best interest of the child standard can be used to validate certain lifestyles while 
condemning others as immoral.  When the subjective morality of a parent can be used in 
custody decisions, everyone, apparently is at risk.”  Weaver-Catalana, supra  note 77, at 607;  
see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturning the decision of a Florida court that 
took custody of a child away from a biological parent who married a person of a different 
race). 
82  See Weaver-Catalana, supra  note 77, at 604. 
83  140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). 
84  See Lewis, supra  note 17, at 267. 
85  Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 158. 
86  Id. at 154.  The boy’s father placed him with his grandparents on a temporary basis after 
his mother and sister were tragically killed in a car accident.  Id. at 153.  Approximately sixteen 
months later, the grandparents refused to return the boy pursuant to the father’s request.  Id. 
  
87  Id. at 154.  The Iowa Supreme Court stated:    
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Also,  proponents of the parental preference argue that custody decisions that are 
not based on biology create incentives for third parties to kidnap or wrongfully retain a 
child.88  In Hoy v. Willis,89 a testifying expert asserted that if a couple kidnapped a 
baby, became its psychological parents, and were equal in all respects to the biological 
parents, it would be in the child’s best interests to award custody to the kidnappers.90  
Likewise, without the application of a parental preference, parents who face difficult 
circumstances and need child care assistance on a temporary basis may risk losing 
custody of their children.91  
 
Based on the public policy reasons favoring the parental preference in initial custody 
disputes between biological parents and third parties, some courts have extended a 
parental preference to custody modification cases.92  However, for reasons discussed in 
the next section, the parental preference should not be extended to modification cases, 
and in C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court properly rejected Roberto’s arguments in 
                                                                                                                         
The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, conventional, middle-
class midwest background and an opportunity for a college education and 
profession, if he desires it.  It provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere.  
In the Painter home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct and thought with an 
opportunity to develop his individual talents.  It would be more exciting and 
challenging in many respects, but romantic impractical and unstable. 
Id. 
88  See Lewis, supra note 17, at 265-66 & n.37 (stating that “many situations can be 
imagined in which this result is perfectly plausible”).    Katharine Bartlett proposes that third 
parties should not be recognized as a possible custodians unless they prove that their 
relationship with the child arose pursuant to consent from the biological parent(s) or a court 
order.  Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra  note 18, at 947. 
89  398 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).   
90  John Batt, Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Best Interests Paradigm: A 
Contemporary Assessment of the Goldstein/ Freud/ Solnit Position and the Group's Painter 
v. Bannister Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REV. 621, 655-56 (1992 ) (citing Hoy v. Willis, 398 A.2d 
109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) as evidence that a strict application of the best interests 
model “may beget monsters of jurisprudential injustice”). 
91  See Richards, supra  note 6, at 748.  In Painter, the father’s intention was to place the 
children with their grandparents on a temporary basis.  Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156.  Ironically, 
the court proclaimed, “A father should be encouraged to look for help with the children, from 
those who love them without the risk of thereby losing the custody of the children 
permanently.”  Id. 
92  See, e.g., Anderson v. Hall, 823 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).  In Anderson, the 
biological father attempted to modify a custody decree awarding custody to the child’s 
grandparents.  Id. at 111.  The Missouri Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of the 
custody modification statute, which required a change in the child’s or the custodian’s 
circumstances.  Id. at 115.  The court applied a parental preference and modified the custody 
decree based solely on changes in the father’s circumstances.  Id. 
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reaching its holding.93  A biological parent’s change of heart should not be permitted to 
disrupt a child’s stability.94 
 
2.  Law’s Desire to Meet Children’s Needs for Stability 
 
Almost all psychologists and psychiatrists agree that it is crucial for a child to 
maintain stable and continuous relationships.95  Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (hereinafter 
“Goldstein”) created a jurisprudential paradigm96 that has helped to “revolutionize” the 
analysis of child custody disputes.97  Under this paradigm, a child’s psychological well-
being is a paramount concern in custody litigation,98 and interruptions in relationships 
are viewed as being extremely damaging to a child’s psychological development.99  The 
amount of potential damage created by these interruptions depends on a child’s age, and 
the younger the child, the greater the risk.100  Significantly, Goldstein asserts that this 
                                                 
93  See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
94  See Bartlett, supra  note 18, at 902. 
95  Blair, supra  note 30, at 116. 
96  J.  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).  A 
jurisprudential paradigm is the result of “observation, conceptualization, and imagination,” 
and acts as a guide to “research, policy creation, norm construction, proof presentation, and 
decision-making.”   Batt, supra  note 90, at 621-22.  Batt states that courts can make better 
decisions when expert witnesses, lawyers, and judges use paradigms.  Id. at 623.  This 
“interdisciplinary effort” is based on law, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis.  Id. at 685 n.5. 
97  Batt, supra  note 90, at 623.  “Judges, lawyers, law professors, law students, mental 
health professionals, social scientists and concerned laymen have been very affected by their 
message.”  Id. at 625.  However, Batt argues that Goldstein is “overly apprehensive.”  Id. at 
641.  Batt discusses a  study indicating that psychiatrists  claiming there is a link between 
childhood trauma and adult psychopathology often derive their research from observations 
of disturbed individuals.  Id.  Because these psychiatrists  do not study individuals who 
faced childhood trauma and did not develop mental problems as adults, their conclusions may 
be incorrect.  Id.  Batt asserts, “Not every child of divorce or of a custody dispute is a victim 
proximate to his or her psychic undoing.  Life is as it is . . . . Children are resilient.”  Id. at 642-
43.  Therefore, the courts must examine the “totality of relevant psychosocial circumstances.” 
 Id. at 645. 
98  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 96, at 4. 
99  Id. at 32-33.   In addition, Goldstein asserts that courts must look at interruptions in 
continuity from children’s subjective perceptions of time and act quickly to prevent 
permanent psychological harm.  Id. at 41. 
100  Id. at 32.  The child’s needs must be analyzed by examining “the totality of relevant 
psychosocial circumstances.”  Batt, supra  note 90, at 645.  Therefore, in order to make the 
optimum decision for a child, courts must determine what the child’s needs are in relation to 
the child’s developmental status.  Id.  Erik Erikson’s theoretical model, which contains eight 
life stages,  is “soundly rooted in clinical observation.”  Id. at 674.  According to Batt, 
“Erikson is certainly Western culture’s foremost student of human development.”  Id. at 685 
n.7.  The five stages that can provide guidance in child custody disputes are as follows:  
18
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damage can consist of mental illness, dependence on society, or criminal behavior.101 
 
According to Goldstein, custody determinations should be made according to a 
“least detrimental alternative” standard.102  Application of this standard maximizes a 
                                                                                                                         
Stage I--(approximately the first year of life).  During this developmental phase, the 
child has the opportunity to achieve a positive life view called basic trust.  Basic 
trust develops when the child is well cared for, psychologically and physically, by 
an adult or adults of attachment.  An appropriate experience in attachment during 
this stage of development prepares one for human intimacy and social interaction in 
later stages.    
Stage II--(about the second and third year of life).  The child seeks to develop 
personal autonomy and begins to explore the home environment. 
Stage III--(about age four and five).  The child starts to take a serious interest in life 
outside of the home.  The child is learning through play.  Attachments to people 
outside of the home are made. 
Stage IV--(approximately the sixth through the eleventh year).  The child becomes 
immersed in the outside culture.  The acquisition of culturally approved skills and 
knowledge is the major task of this stage.  This is the stage of essential learning.  
Stage V--(about the twelfth through eighteenth year).  The child is in the process of 
consolidating the emerging self.  Cultural and gender identities are worked out. 
Id. at 646.  At the time of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in C.R.B., both Peter and Brian 
were in Stage IV of Erikson’s model.  See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).  A child in 
this stage is in the process of moral, cognitive, social, aesthetic, and emotional development.  
Batt, supra  note 90, at 651-52.  Therefore, according to Batt, “To appropriately decide a child 
custody case involving a learning stage child, one must think not only about the parents, but 
must engage in a prospective analysis which considers the psycho-social situation of the 
child in adolescence.”  Id. at 653-54.  However, the Alaska Supreme Court focuses on 
maintaining stability in the Peter and Brian’s lives.  C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.   
101  See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 96, at 18.  In addition, psychologists state that a 
judicial separation of a child and a psychological parent can hinder the child’s capacity to 
trust and care for others, injure the child’s self-esteem, and hurt the child’s identification with 
social ideals.  Thompson, supra  note 28, at 562.  Also, research indicates that when children 
perceive that they have minimum control over environmental changes subsequent to a 
divorce, they may experience depression, social withdrawal, and aggressive behavior.  
Wexler, supra  note 2, at 796-97.  Some researchers have indicated that a change in residence 
can be very detrimental to children.  Id. at 796.   
102  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 96, at 53.  Goldstein believes that the “least detrimental 
alternative” standard will serve as a reminder that custody decisions are intrinsically 
unsatisfactory.  Id. at 63. 
The least detrimental alternative, then, is that specific placement and procedure for 
placement which maximizes in accord with the child’s sense of time and on the basis 
of short-term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity 
for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship with at 
least one adult who is or will become his psychological parent. 
Id. at 53. 
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child’s opportunity to maintain a relationship with a “psychological parent” who meets 
the child’s needs on a daily basis:103  
 
[F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the direct 
cause of his emotional attachment.  This attachment results from day-to-day 
attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and 
stimulation.  Only a parent who provides for these needs will build a psychological 
relationship to the child on the basis of the biological one and will become his 
“psychological parent” in whose care the child can feel valued and “wanted.”  An 
 absent biological parent will remain, or tend to become, a stranger.104     
 
Also, according to this paradigm, all custody decisions should be final since custody 
modifications threaten continuity of relationships.105 
                                                 
103  Id.  Bartlett notes that experts proclaim that children need one parent or set of parents 
who have complete and undivided control of them.  Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra  
note 18, at 882.  In addition, Bartlett analyzes Goldstein’s assertion that only one relationship 
should be maintained when a family is torn apart because a child’s confusion regarding 
loyalties will impede their adjustment to new circumstances.  Id. at 908.  However, Bartlett 
argues against these contentions and proposes that protection of a child’s need for stability 
in relationships may dictate that courts provide the means for the child to maintain significant 
relationships with more than one parent or set of parents.  Id. at 882.  When a child’s 
biological parents obtain a divorce, the law assumes that each parent will continue to have a 
relationship with the child.  Id. at 899.  According to Bartlett, recent research indicates that 
children who do not maintain contact with absent caretakers will suffer damage at every 
developmental stage.  Id. at 909.  Maintenance of a child’s ties to the past provide feelings of 
security even when the family relationship is unstable.  Id. at 910.  In C.R.B., the Alaska 
Supreme Court noted that the superior court’s order denying Roberto’s motion for 
modification encouraged Roberto to become a more involved parent, and indicated that it is 
important for Peter and Brian to have a strong bond with their biological father.  C.R.B. v. C.C. 
959 P.2d 375, 384 (Alaska 1998).  The Alaska Supreme Court indicated that the superior court 
ordered that Peter and Brian fly to Seattle to visit their father twice a year.  Id.   
104  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 91, at 19.   This model views attachment as crucial to 
healthy psychological development.  Batt, supra  note 90, at 629.  A biological parent who is 
physically absent cannot be a psychological parent.  Id.   Also, Katharine Bartlett proposes 
three additional criteria that courts should utilize to identify a “psychological parent.”  
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra  note 18, at 946.  First, the adult must have physical 
custody of the child for a minimum of six months.  Id. at 946-47.  Second, the adult must 
demonstrate motivations based on sincere concern and care for the child’s welfare.  Also, the 
child’s view of the relationship must be ascertained.  The child mu st believe that the adult has 
a parental role rather than a companion or a babysitter.  Id.  at 947.  Third, to avoid the 
creation of incentives for kidnapping, the petitioning adult must prove that the relationship 
began pursuant to the consent of the biological parent(s) or a court order.  Id.  
105  Batt, supra  note 90, at 661 (disagreeing and noting that a policy that disallows custody 
modifications and “places the child at the total mercy of one parent until the end of 
adolescence can do very little to insure justice for the young”). 
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At the time of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in C.R.B., Peter was nine years 
old, Brian was seven years old, and their grandparents had cared for them for over five 
years.106  Also, Roberto had not seen his sons during almost three years of this time 
period.107  Therefore, according to Goldstein’s paradigm, it is very likely that Peter and 
Brian’s grandparents were their psychological parents.108  Because destruction of 
stability may be extremely detrimental to children, the law’s goal should be to promote 
continuity in children’s lives.109  However, application of a parental preference focuses 
on parental rights and ignores the negative consequences of tearing children away from 
their psychological parents.110  Fortunately, the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding 
produced an optimum result in C.R.B. because it did not tear Peter and Brian away 
from their grandparents.111 
 
B.  Consequences of the Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision 
 
Although the Alaska Supreme Court’s refusal to apply a parental preference 
produced a desirable outcome in C.R.B., the substantial change in circumstances 
modification standard does not adequately protect children.112  It appears that courts are 
“defining changed circumstances as a change in any circumstance pertinent to the best 
interests of the child, so that the two standards merge de facto.”113  The flexibility 
allowed under a substantial change in circumstances standard of modification may 
create undesirable consequences.114  For example, custody modification decisions 
frequently reflect the belief that remarriage is a substantial change in circumstances that 
                                                 
106  See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375, 377 (Alaska 1988). 
107  Id. 
108  See discussion supra  Part IV.A.2. 
109  Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 18, at 902. 
110  See Lewis, supra  note 17, at 265 (discussing arguments advanced by critics of the 
parental preference standard).  Lewis also indicates that laws should “mandate speedy 
resolution of custody disputes to prevent rewarding the party who can retain physical 
possession of the child for the longest time.”  Id. at 283.   
111  See C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380. 
112  See C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 931 (1989). Vasterling 
states, “Modification under this standard . . . may not promote the child’s “best interests,” 
and in fact, often promotes the contrary.”  Id. at 931.  In addition, utilization of the substantial 
change in circumstances standard produces negative consequences for each party.  Id. at 
930-31.  Because the standard is vague and discretionary, it promotes relitigation of custody 
modification disputes.  Id. at 930.  Relitigation creates emotional and financial turmoil for each 
person who is involved in the litigation.  Id. at 931. 
113  See Wexler, supra  note 2, at 782.   
114  See id. at 796; see also Vasterling, supra  note 112, at 930.  Because the substantial 
change of circumstances standard is vague, courts may base their custody decisions on 
irrelevant changes or personal biases.   Id. 
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justifies the elimination of stability in a child’s life.115   However, there is no empirical 
support for the assumption that this remarriage will produce a stable nuclear family, and 
in fact, remarriage may actually cause increased difficulties for children.116  Tragically, 
if the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply the substantial change in circumstances 
standard in custody modification disputes, there is a risk that children will experience 
psychological damage117 due to the destruction of stability in their lives.118 
 
C.  States Should Adopt a Revised Version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce 
Act’s119 Custody Modification Standard 
 
The Court’s ability to modify custody orders should be limited by strict statutory 
criteria.120  The UMDA’s drafters acknowledged the importance of stability in a child’s 
life, and recognized that “insuring the decree’s finality is more important than 
determining which party should be the custodian.”121  Because the UMDA’s 
modification provisions promote continuity in children’s lives by placing procedural and 
substantive limitations on a court’s ability to modify initial custody orders, states should 
enact these provisions.122  However, the UMDA’s modification provision that requires a 
                                                 
115  See Wexler, supra note 2, at 795.     
116  Id.  According to Wexler, the remarriage example is only one illustration of the 
“potential abuse” that may occur due to the use of “amorphous” substantial change of 
circumstances standards.  Id.  “Courts operating under such malleable substantive rules are 
able to use assumptions unsupported by empirical evidence to effect changes that, upon 
closer analysis, make no sense . . . .”  Id.  
117  See supra  note 101 and accompanying text.  Social science research has influenced the 
development of the law in initial custody disputes, and there is no reason that this data 
should be less important in the context of custody modifications.  Wexler, supra  note 2, at 
784. 
118  See Vasterling, supra  note 112, at 931-32 (recognizing that experts agree that “stability 
is paramount to a child’s development” and that courts can decrease the negative 
consequences that result from a disruption in stability by “ensuring the finality of the initial 
custody decree”).     
119  UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 101-506 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1998).  
For a discussion of UMDA, see supra  notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
120  See Wexler, supra  note 2, at 760.  Wexler indicates that custody modifications are 
becoming easier to obtain, and that the “law today is moving in precisely the wrong 
direction.”  Id.  Wexler examines social science research indicating that stability is an 
important factor in children’s lives, and argues that modification is justified only in “special 
cases.”  Id.  
121  UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT  § 409 cmt. (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 439-40 (1998) 
(citing Andrew S. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following 
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969)).   
122  Vasterling, supra  note 112 at 947.  UMDA section 409(b) limits the judge’s dis cretion 
by dictating that the change in circumstances must relate to either the child or the custodian.  
Id. at 932.  Also, section 409(b) assumes that  unless one of the three conditions exists, a 
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change that seriously endangers the child’s physical or mental health123 should 
specifically define “endangers seriously” to avoid a liberal interpretation by the 
courts.124   
 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s refusal to utilize a parental preference produced a 
proper outcome in C.R.B.125 However, the substantial change in circumstances 
modification standard does not adequately protect children’s need for stability.126  If 
this standard is applied in future cases, there is a risk that children may face emotional 
harm.127  It is better to make a biological parent cope with feelings of despair regarding 
loss of custody than to make a child cope with further disruption and instability.128 
 
Laura Beresh Taylor 
                                                                                                                         
change in custody does not promote a child’s best interests.  Id. At 933.  The UMDA requires 
a two year waiting period subsequent to a final custody order, but there is a provision for 
emergency situations.  See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT  § 409(a).  This emergency 
provision recognizes that protecting a child from serious physical or mental harm should 
always take precedence over stability in residence.  See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
ACT  § 409 cmt.  Wexler noted that the threshold modification standard that a movant must 
satisfy during the first two years after the issuance of the decree acts as a procedural hurdle 
since it is the same modification standard that all movants must establish.  See Wexler, supra 
note 2, at 775.   
123  UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT  § 409(b)(3); see supra note 44.   
124  See Wexler, supra  note 2, at 782.  Illinois adopted the UMDA provisions from October 
1, 1977 until July 1, 1982, and Wexler indicates that Illinois’ case law is “the largest body of 
judicial interpretation of the UMDA test.”  Id. at 766.  Wexler determined that the Illinois 
courts utilized a “liberal approach to an intentionally illiberal statute” and exercised significant 
discretion in granting modifications.  Id. at 778; see, e.g., Kraft v. Kraft, 439 N.E. 2d 491, 496 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that a child was in serious danger because, although she was 
doing well in school, she was not achieving her potential); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E. 2d 421 
(Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980) (modifying custody to protect the children’s moral 
development after the custodial parent announced that a male friend was going to be living 
with her); Wexler, supra  note 2, at 777-78.  Therefore, the definition of “endangers seriously”  
should specifically relate to whether the custodian is safeguarding the child’s physical and 
mental health rather than whether the child’s best interests are being served.  Id. at 782.   
125  See discussion supra  Part IV.A.2. 
126  See discussion supra  Parts IV.A.2 and IV.C. 
127  See discussion supra  Parts IV.A.2 and IV.C.   
128  See Haynie, supra  note 19, at 744.  “[T]hird party custody disputes most often involve 
children subjected to disruption of the traditional family by divorce, death, or other hardships. 
 In theses cases, the ideal family situation is not an alternative for the child.”  Id. at 745. 
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